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ABSTRACT 
According to some recent empirical papers, periods of low interest rates would favor a 
risk-taking channel of monetary policy whereby bank risk-appetite and risk-taking 
behavior would be stronger after. Several theoretical explanations exist to this 
phenomenon, such as the managerial compensation schemes linked to fixed objectives, 
the procyclical valuation methods of assets, income and cash flows, or the abundant 
liquidity at a low cost. This paper studies the risk behavior of the main French banks 
during a recent period of low interest rates (1998-2008) and concludes to the existence of 
a risk-taking channel. In addition, our analysis suggests that liquid banks are more prone 
to risk-taking. We also highlight a higher risk transmission for banks relying more on 
fees and commission income. 
Keywords: bank risk, risk-taking channel, monetary policy, income structure, liquidity, 
French banks. 
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I. Introduction 
After the 2008 subprime crisis and the financial system disruptions that followed, many 
questions surfaced, rethinking the global financial system from every possible angle in 
search for loopholes to blame: the poor regulatory framework, systemic institutions, 
hazardous financial instruments, excessive reliance on rating agencies opinion, fuzzy 
accounting rules and standards, and bad bank governance. Last but not least, central 
banks are also indicted for putting on ultra loose monetary policies. This question is all 
the more striking as the present policy of the Federal Reserve in response to the crisis is 
also bringing back to memories the low interest rate levels applied in the aftermath of the 
technology bubble burst in 2001 and that some believe fanned the flame for the 2008 
meltdown. This matter has turned to a vigorous debate among economists1. 
Recent studies show that “too low for too long” interest rates result in a higher risk-taking 
by banks through a “risk-taking channel”. There exist many theoretical explanations, 
such as managerial compensation schemes and nominal objectives that lead to a higher 
risk taking when interest rates are low. Low interest rates boost asset value and collateral 
valuation leading to a money illusion and alter risk perception by banks. Risk can also 
derive from the presence of abundant liquidity or even from low credit screening 
standards when banks deal will a growing amount of credit requests. From 2009 onward, 
convincing empirical studies established that monetary policy is not fully neutral from a 
financial stability perspective. Evidence from the United States and Europe corroborated 
the reality of a risk-taking channel and showed that periods of very low interest rates are 
followed by higher risk-taking by banks. 
These findings are of prominent interest to central banks with respect to the possible 
adverse effect of their policies on bank risk-taking. Also, supervisory and prudential 
authorities may find answers on when to be particularly vigilant, and on the subjects that 
could be more prone to risk-taking behavior. 
                                                           
1 See: (1) Rajan R., 2010, “Why we should exit ultra low rates: A guest post”, Freakonomics, August 25. 
and (2) Krugman P., 2010, “Making it up”, The New York Times, August 23. 
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In this paper, we follow methodology close to that of Altunbas et al. (2009), and assess 
the impact of low interest rates on French banks’ risk during the 1998-2008 period. This 
paper brings novelty on different levels. First, our computation of risk-taking behavior is 
based on several accounting indicators, whereas other studies essentially rely on one 
measure in particular (Expected Default Frequency). Second, although other papers focus 
on US banks (in Altunbas et al (2009), American banks account for 70% of the sample 
individuals), we believe there is a strong case for studying French banks. Indeed, the risk-
taking channel should be stronger in bank-based economies like France. On the other 
hand, the French system is highly regulated and has been adopting the universal banking 
model since the Second Banking Directive of the European Economic Community in 
1989. Third, while the risk-taking channel has been studied relatively to individual banks 
characteristics such as size, capitalization and liquidity; our study is the first one to 
address the relation between risk-taking channel and bank income structure, bringing 
additional insights on the transmission mechanism. 
Our results give evidence on the existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for 
French banks, when assessed using seven different risk indicators. We also find an 
unorthodox positive link between GDP growth and higher risk levels. Our results also 
show a higher risk-taking transmission for liquid banks. Finally, risk-taking channel 
seems to differ according to income structure; results are in favor of basic banking 
models that are less prone to risk transmission of monetary policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a survey of 
theoretical and empirical work on the risk-taking channel. In section 3 we carry out our 
empirical assessment including robustness checks accounting for bank characteristics and 
income structure component. Section 4 concludes. 
II. Monetary policy and risk-taking channel: from theory to empirical evidence 
1. The credit channel 
Before addressing the effect of short-term interest rates on risk appetite and risk-taking, 
one should first consider the impact of monetary policy on the real economy through 
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credit. Classically, short-term interest rates determine the cost of capital and their level 
affect the investment decisions of firms. A large literature has investigated the monetary 
“black box” and illustrated its enhancement mechanism, referred to as the credit channel 
of monetary policy, through which levels of interest rates influence the demand and 
availability of credit (Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Mishkin (1996)). The credit channel 
has been broken down into a balance-sheet channel and a bank-lending channel 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995): In the balance-sheet channel, a drop in interest rates raises 
the value of assets (collateral) and cash flows2 of candidate borrowers, both households 
and firms. This, in turn, reduces moral hazard and makes potential borrowers 
creditworthy, which leads to an increase in the supply of loans3. In the bank-lending 
channel, tight monetary policy like open market policies can drain deposits from the 
banks liabilities, forcing them to seek (uninsured) non-deposit financing at a higher cost 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1994). This alteration in the bank liability structure causes external 
finance premium4 to rise and therefore a lower supply of intermediated credit. The bank-
lending channel has the greatest effect on lending policies of the smallest and least liquid 
banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). To sum up, the credit channel can be seen as a dual 
effect of monetary policy on credit supply coming from both the asset and liability side of 
bank balance sheet. 
The above literature discusses the nexus between monetary policy and loan supply, but 
does not address the risk appetite of banks. In fact when monetary policy is expansive, 
banks might engage in lending relations with borrowers that were perceived as risky in 
the past but are now eligible for credit due to an improvement in their net worth 
(following a drop in interest rates). However, there is a silver lining between granting 
more credit and higher-risk taking and the first does not necessarily imply the latter. 
 
                                                           
2 A decrease in interest rates reduces interest burden on borrowers. This eases the borrowers’ cash flow 
since they rely on short-term debt to finance their working capital needs. Monetary easing also has a 
positive effect on aggregate demand and thus on firms’ revenues. 
3 The balance-sheet channel can also operate directly on banks as lower interest rates can increase their 
assets valuation and therefore their capacity to attract funds. 
4 “External finance premium is the difference in cost between funds raised externally (by issuing equity or 
debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining earnings)” Bernanke and Gertler (2005). 
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2. Theoretical insights on the risk-taking channel 
The designation of the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy first appeared in Borio 
and Zhu (2008) who shed light explicitly on this transmission mechanism defined as “the 
impact of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance and hence on 
the degree of risk in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets, and on the price and non-
price terms of the extension of funding”. 
Practically, the channel can be explained by the effect of interest rates on valuations, 
income and cash flows. Low interest rates lead to a boost in collateral value, which alters 
risk perception and risk tolerance. Risk aversion also depends on banks’ own net worth; 
lower interest rates imply a higher value of banks’ assets portfolios, this leads to a higher 
net worth that entices banks to take more credit risk (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). On 
the contrary, high levels of interest rates reduce banks’ net worth triggering “gambling 
for resurrection” as a way out (Kane, 1989) (Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). One 
of the main reasons behind such risk myopia is the procyclical nature of risk indicators 
like the Value at Risk (Danielson et al, 2004) and the Probability of Default. 
Another angle to explore the mechanism is through managerial compensation schemes 
that are linked to nominal targets, therefore giving managers incentives to take on more 
risk. In this context, low levels of short-term interest rates can lead to procyclical risk-
taking by managers in an attempt to “search for yield” (Rajan, 2005). Such behavior is 
amplified by herding phenomena due to high competition between managers. It is also 
often related to the nature of the contracts as in the case of insurance companies and 
pension funds that often commit to long-term fixed performance targets. 
Communication policies by monetary authorities can also lead to risk-taking (Borio and 
Zhu, 2008). When a central bank is predictable and transparent, as it is the case with most 
central banks, it removes the uncertainty about the future and creates an “insurance 
effect” leading to a general belief that it will dam up large downside risks. 
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Moreover, credit screening can be related to the presence of informational asymmetry 
among banks. Dell’ Arriccia and Marquez (2006) show5 that when dealing with a large 
volume of new borrowers, banks relax their screening standards and increase their risk-
taking. The model also predicts that episodes of financial distress are more likely to take 
place after periods of strong credit expansion, corollary to periods of very low interest 
rates and/or financial deregulation. 
Bank credit screening can also be distorted via habit formation; by analogy to the equity 
risk premium (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), banks can become less risk-averse during 
periods of expansion and economic outputs that are higher than normal levels. 
Risk-taking can also operate trough a “liquidity risk-taking channel”. Diamond and Rajan 
(2006) show how banks can be exposed to a sudden rise in demand for money (after 
delays in aggregate production), this is followed by an increase in interest rates that banks 
should pay to depositors, thus increasing even more the deposit burden. In such cases, 
appropriate open market policies can ease the drought by lowering interest rate and limit 
the threat of deposit withdrawals, preventing credit rationing and bank failure. However, 
the stance of such policies and their duration is questioned (Diamond and Rajan, 2009); 
in a model with no uncertainty on the asset side of banks’ balance sheet (loans quality), 
failure risk can come from massive withdrawals and liquidity shortage. When monetary 
policy is too expansionary, interest rates are low and banks are more levered-up playing 
on the mismatch between short-term deposits and long-term project financing. The more 
the bank is leveraged, the more the risk of failure, the model suggests that monetary 
policy should be tighter then the “normal level” (in expansionary periods) to reduce 
liquidity risk of banks. 
The risk-taking channel is a relatively recent issue of monetary economics and finance, 
thus having its gray areas despite the advances that have been made. In fact, many 
unaddressed questions deserve closer exploration. Borio and zhu (2008) raise some issues 
for future studies: The financial sector is not yet captured in a general equilibrium model, 
let along the transmission channel of monetary policy that is in turn interdependent from 
funding liquidity and market liquidity. Accounting standards and fair value measures are 
                                                           
5 See also Dell’ Arricia et al (2011) on risk-taking in a model with leveraged financial intermediaries. 
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affected by interest rates, which influence behavior and financial decisions, adding to that 
the procyclical nature of risk indicator widely utilized by major financial actors globally. 
The risk-taking channel also raises the difficulty of coordination failure between financial 
institutions and finally the “insurance effect” of central banks policies. 
Despite the fogginess of the transmission mechanism, more evidence is emerging from 
empirical studies that try to elucidate the modalities and characteristics of the risk-taking 
channel. 
 
3. Empirical evidence on the risk-taking channel 
Only a handful of studies test empirically the existence of a risk-taking channel. The first6 
is Jiménez et al (2009) who use data from the Spanish Credit Register. They study the 
evolution of Spanish credits from 1988 to 2006. This empirical assessment confirms the 
relation between the monetary policy stance and risk-taking by banks. The effect of 
interest rate differs depending on its lags. In the short-term, low interest rates reduce the 
interest burden on outstanding loans hence reducing the risk of default (the case of 
variable interest rates or refinancing). On the medium run, whilst granting new loans, 
banks showed to have softened their screening standards by granting credits to borrowers 
with bad credit history. The latter effect corroborates the hypothesis of “search for yield” 
backed by an illusion of wealth and collateral value gain. The study also shows that risk-
taking is more manifest by small banks, for borrowers with multiple banking relations, 
and in a more competitive banking environment. It also appears that liquid banks take 
more risk, which can be attributed to a higher cost of holding liquid assets with low 
yields. 
Ioannidou et al (2009) follow a similar methodology by studying individual loan data in 
Bolivia from 1999 to 2003, a period where the economy was almost fully dollarized. The 
US federal funds rate constitutes a good indicator of an exogenous monetary policy, 
                                                           
6 Amato (2005) had already established a positive relation between CDS risk premiums and the real interest 
rate gap as a measure of monetary policy stance, studying the US CDS market during the period 2002-
2005. 
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which was abnormally relaxed during the studied period. The study confirms that a 
decrease in interest rates prior to loan origination raises the probability of default on 
individual bank loans. It goes on to adding important insights on the pricing of the new 
risky loans. Surprisingly, Bolivian banks charged less the new risky loans relatively to 
the less risky ones, giving strong evidence of a change in risk perception (risk-premium). 
Results on bank characteristics showed that banks with low foreign funding take more 
risk, as they have no outside monitoring. Results are the same as Jiménez et al (2009) 
with respect to liquidity. 
Altunbas et al (2009) study the risk-taking of 643 banks covering 16 countries7 from 
1998 to 2008. They estimate risk via the Expected Default Frequency8 (EDF), a forward-
looking indicator of risk. The study corroborates the relation between low interest rates9 
and bank risk. This conclusion remains valid when risk is assessed by idiosyncratic 
measures based on market information; risk-taking is established as specific to banks and 
is not a result of systemic components. Bank characteristics analysis shows a positive 
relation between size and risk-taking, liquid banks however are less risky. Those results 
differ from Jiménez et al (2009) and Ioannidou et al (2009) and can be linked to country 
specific or regulatory characteristics. 
In addition, the degree of risk-taking is also a function of the time-span of the monetary 
easing period; Gambacorta (2009) shows that between 2002 and 2006 the US Federal 
Funds rate where below the benchmark10 for 17 consecutive quarters versus 10 quarters 
for European banks, subsequently US banks where on average riskier than European 
banks. 
Some other empirical researches study risk-taking with respect to lending standards. Dell’ 
Arriccia et al (2009) assess the credit screening11 in the US subprime mortgage market 
between 2001 and 2006, the results confirm their theoretical scheme (Dell’ Arriccia and 
Marquez, 2006) whereby there is a negative correlation between the number of loan 
                                                           
7 US banks constitute 71% of total sample individuals, which makes de facto their results US-focused. 
8 EDF is a risk indicator supplied by Moody’s KMV. 
9 Interest rates are considered low relatively to the natural interest rate and the Taylor rule. 
10 Gambacorta applies the same methodology and database as Altunbas et al (2009). 
11 The study uses the Denial Rate and the Loan to Income ratios as lending standards indicators. 
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applicants and the quality of the screening, and this relation appears to be stronger when 
associated with more competition. Another important result is the negative relationship 
between screening quality and house price appreciation, which leads to think that 
American banks gambled on speculative borrowers. Similar results on the risk-taking 
channel come from Madaloni and Peydro (2010) who analyze lending standards12 in the 
US and the Euro area from 2002 to 2008. They find that too low short-term interest rates 
soften lending standards, however the relation does not stand for long-term interest rates. 
The most recent paper to our knowledge is of Delis and Kouretas (2011): the authors 
assess the risk-taking channel on 3,628 European banks from 16 countries over the period 
2001-2008. They define bank risk using 2 indicators: the ratio of risky assets to total 
assets and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Results confirm the existence 
of a risk-taking channel on the studied panel. More importantly, to authors notice a lower 
risk-taking for French banks13; results based on the “risky assets to total assets” indicator 
are les significant for France (significant at 10%), in addition, French banks show the 
highest average bank-lending rate in comparison to Germany, Italy and Spain. 
III. Empirical assessment on the French banking system 
1. The dataset and the indicators 
Our dataset contains annual14 balance sheet and income statement information extracted 
from Bankscope. The initial sample accounted for 150 banks operating in France; it has 
been narrowed down to 37 banks taking into account consolidation and subsidiaries 
accounts15, along with data availability (descriptive statistics in Table 1). The French 
banking system is highly concentrated with 5 groups, operating under 9 banking entities 
that represent more than 90% of the industry total assets and total loans. Our sample 
covers those groups in addition to smaller banks. For macroeconomic data, interest rates 
                                                           
12 They study answers from the Bank Lending Survey for the Euro zone and the Senior Loan Officer 
Survey for the US. 
13 The article studies 493 French banks, judging by the number of banks studied this means that subsidiaries  
(regional) accounts where favored over consolidated accounts. 
14 Unfortunately quarterly data was not available to us for this study, though it would have helped better 
capture the dynamic in the model. 
15 About 60 banks of the initial sample are regional subsidiaries of Groupe Crédit Agricole and Groupe 
Banque Populaire-Caisse d’Epargne and Groupe Crédit Mutuel. 
 13 
where extracted from Reuters, GDP and inflation variables from the ECB and Eurostat, 
and housing prices from the INSEE. 
- Risk indicators 
Using the accounting data available we have constructed several risk indicators widely 
used in the literature as in Boyd and Graham (1986), Goyeau and Tarazi (1992), Lepetit 
et al. (2007), Altunbas et al (2010): (a) In the absence of reliable data on non performing 
loans for our sample we turned to the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, hereafter 
LLP, this ratio is considered to be a forward looking measure of expected credit losses as 
assessed and forecasted by banks. We also use the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross total 
assets (hereafter LLR) as a proxy for credit portfolio quality. (b) The Standard deviations 
of return on average assets, and return on average equity noted STDROA and STDROE 
measure return volatility. (c) The Z-score16 of return on average assets, and equity 
(ZROA and ZROE, respectively) can be interpreted as measures of risk adjusted returns, 
and the ZP-score17 (noted ZPSCR) is an indicator that captures portfolio risk and bank 
leverage risk; the latter three insolvency indicators imply lower risk the higher their 
values. 
In addition to the above accounting-based indicators, we use the change in expected 
default frequency (∆EDF), a forward-looking indicator computed by Moody’s based on 
the Merton (1974) model of corporate bond pricing. EDF has been used in recent bank-
risk literature as in Altunbas18 et al (2009 and 2010) and Gambacorta (2009). 
Unfortunately, EDF data was only available for 14 French banks that we believe are 
worth studying as a separate sample (sample 1). 
- Evidence of low interest rate 
In Jiménez et al (2009), Ioannidou et al (2009) and Delis and Kouretas (2011) monetary 
policy stance is expressed by the change in overnight rates, the German interbank rates or 
the three months interbank. Their assumption is that interest rates where below their 
                                                           
16 ZROE = (100 + average ROE%) / STDROE% (Boyd and Graham, 1986). 
17 ZP-score = 
€ 
averageROA
STDROA +
average Total equity /Total assets( )
STDROA
, Goyeau and Tarazi (1992). 
18 We thank M. Yener Altunbas (Bangor University), for giving us access to the French banks EDF data. 
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historical levels. On the other hand, Altunbas et al (2009) analyze monetary stance with 
respect to what the Taylor rule dictates. We follow the latter strategy that answers the 
question “how low is low?” with a specific benchmark since we are analyzing the impact 
of excessively low rates and not a drop in interest rates, moreover results in Altunbas et al 
(2009) show a different effects (signs) for the three months rate and the Taylor gap on 
risk-taking. 
Taylor rule gap (TGAP) is defined as the difference between the 3 months French 
interbank rate and the rate implied by the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing, 
according to the formula: 
€ 
it = α + βπ (π t −π *) + βy (yt − y*) + γ (it − it−1) . 
TGAP is computed using 
€ 
βπ =1.5 and 
€ 
βy=0.5 giving more weight to the inflation 
objective and using an interest rate smoothing coefficient ( ) of 0.9. The target inflation 
(
€ 
π*) has been set to 2% in reference to the ECB objectives, and the real interest rate ( ) 
has been set to 4% assuming a nominal long-term interest rate of 2%. Chart119 shows 
evidence of a lean monetary policy during the period 2000-2008, with a maximum gap of 
2.6% in 2004. We use the change in the 3 months interbank rate (∆3M) as a measure of 
monetary policy stance, and the slope of the yield curve20 (YSLOPE) as an indicator of 
money market conditions that influence the “transformation” activity of banks and their 
profitability. 
 
2. The empirical strategy 
We use the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Bundell and Bond (1998) Dynamic GMM 
panel to cope with the following typical obstacles: (a) In order to analyze the dynamic 
and persistence of risk-taking with respect to change in monetary policy, the risk 
variables will be regressed over their lags, which produces simultaneity among the 
independent variables. (b) Time-invariant bank characteristics, which are present in the 
                                                           
19 Alternatively, we compute TGAP1 following the standard Taylor rule, with 
€ 
βy  =
€ 
βπ = 0.5 and 
€ 
γ =0. The 
two measures are strongly correlated (R2 = 0.6), hence we base our analysis on the TGAP with interest rate 
smoothing that is less severe in average that TGAP1. 
20 YSLOPE is equal to the 10 years French government bond minus the 3 months interbank rate 
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error term, may be correlated with the explanatory variable. System GMM removes the 
fixed effect from the error term. (c) We are in the case of a “small T - large N” sample, 
meaning that bank specific shocks will persist over the short time-spam studied. Also, 
any correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term will be 
persistent in small time series. (d) The explanatory variables in our model are not strictly 
exogenous, thus they will be instrumented using their lagged levels. 
Following recommendations by Roodman (2006) on dynamic panel modeling in Stata, 
we use forward orthogonal deviation (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to minimize data loss. 
We also add in the regression of sample1 time dummies21 (as 9 out of the 14 banks 
studied are related to one group and thus strongly correlated). We test our model using 
the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions that ensures the validity of the instruments 
when its related P-value is large. Also, we validate the AR1 and AR2 tests for first and 
second-order autocorrelation; AR1 P-value is expected to be low, implying a first order 
correlation (expected in the difference GMM equation), AR2 P-value should be large 
accepting the null hypothesis of no order 2 serial correlations of the residual term. 
 
Bank specific variables are tested for stationnarity with the Levin-Lin-Chu test. Results in 
Table 5 confirm stationnarity except for STDROE. 
 
3. Assessment based on Expected Default Frequency (sample 1) 
Our first sample is constituted of a panel of 14 banks with data covering the period 1998-
2008. We start with the following model in which we regress the annual change in 
Expected Default Frequency (∆EDF) on its one-year lag, change in the three months 
interbank rate (∆3M), the Taylor rule gap (TGAP), the change in nominal GDP 
                                                           
21 “Include time dummies: The autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard 
errors assume no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time dummies make this 
assumption more likely to hold.” Roodman (2006) p.43 
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(∆GDPN22). We also add yearly dummies in our specification to end up with the baseline 
model (I): 
€ 
ΔEDFt = α ΔEDFt−1 + βΔ3Mt−1 + γ TGAPt−1 + λΔGDPNt−1 +σ Dum +ε  
Results in table 6 confirm the dynamic aspect of our risk equation, with a positive and 
significant coefficient (0.316) for the lagged dependent variable; this coefficient can be 
interpreted as the speed of convergence to the optimal risk level, with values closer to 
zero meaning a higher speed of adjustment. The monetary policy stance measured by 
∆3M has the positive expected sign; lower rates reduce the interest burden on outstanding 
loans leading to less risk on credit portfolios, such effect has been established in Jimenez 
et al (2009) as a short-term effect of low interest rates. 
The coefficient of the TGAP is negative and significant confirming that when interest 
rates are below the Taylor benchmark (smaller/negative values of TGAP), banks take 
more risk.  Our results are so far consistent with the discussed literature. 
Coming to our first macroeconomic variable, the coefficient of ∆GDPN is positive and 
significant; in times of good economic outlook banks tend to grant more credit thus 
reducing their screening process (Dell’ Arriccia et al, 2009), banks can also engage in 
riskier activities in search for high yield. Delis and Kouretas (2011) find a similar nexus 
between GDP growth and risk when analyzing the European banking sector; in fact, risk 
can be higher despite good economic conditions. 
We extend out model by adding the annual changes in the stock market returns (∆SM) 
and the changes in the housing price index (∆HP) leading to results II and III respectively 
in table 6: 
€ 
ΔEDFt = α ΔEDFt−1 + βΔ3Mt−1 + γ TGAPt−1 + λΔGDPNt−1 +ϕΔSMt−1 +θ ΔHPt−1 +σ Dum +ε  
Whereas we expect for the stock market returns a similar result as for GDP growth, we 
find a negative coefficient for the change for stock market returns (∆SM), suggesting that 
a rise in stock returns reduces bank risk. A possible interpretation is that higher stock 
                                                           
22 ∆GDPN has been orthogonalized with respect to ∆3M due to high correlation (0.8) between those 
variables. 
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market returns are associated with a higher value for securities portfolios held by banks 
as well as an upward valuation of collateral. 
We analyze housing prices as one of the main drivers behind the 2008 crisis; we do not 
establish a significance of the coefficient for the change in housing prices (∆HP). In fact, 
France did not experience a housing boom-bust cycle, and the reason behind that could 
be the strong regulation23 of housing related credit activities. 
In equation IV, we account for market concentration as a proxy for the level of 
competition in the banking sector. We add to the equation a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) calculated based on individual loans share of total sample loans: 
€ 
ΔEDFt = α ΔEDFt−1 + βΔ3Mt−1 + γ TGAPt−1 + λΔGDPNt−1 +ϕΔSMt−1 +θ ΔHPt−1 +ηHHI +σ Dum +ε
 
As smaller values of HHI imply more competition, the negative sign of this variable 
corroborates the “search for high yield” hypothesis (Rajan, 2005) and brings evidence 
that bank risk is higher in more competitive markets. 
We finally conclude this section by accounting for the yield curve slope (YSLOPE). This 
measure was dissociated from the other interest rate components due to strong correlation 
with ∆3m and TGAP. We regress the following equation V of table 6: 
€ 
ΔEDFt = α ΔEDFt−1 + γ TGAPt−1 +δYSLOPEt−1 + λΔGDPNt−1 +σ Dum +ε  
Results are similar to those obtained in the previous specifications. Including the yield 
curve in our equation helps analyzing the core business of banks. The variable YSLOPE 
has a negative and significant coefficient; in fact, when the yield curve is steep the 
transformation activity of banks is more profitable considering the duration mismatch 
between the long-term assets and the short-term liabilities, which explains the lower bank 
risk. Results remain unchanged in term of signs and significance when we orthogonalize 
YSLOPE to TGAP to cope with high correlation (not reported). 
 
                                                           
23 The Neiertz law (1990) on property loans aims to avoid over-borrowing, it caps periodical credit 
installment to 33% of the net revenue in that period and is rigorously applied by banks. 
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4. Regression results for different measures of risk (sample 2) 
In this section, we assess a large panel of 37 banks during the period 1998-2008. We use 
several accounting based indicators (as detailed in section III, Paragraph 1) in an attempt 
to confirm the results established so far. The best fitted model in terms of coefficient 
significance is a regression of each risk indicator on its one-year and two-years lags, the 
change in the three months interbank rate (∆3M), the Taylor rule gap (TGAP), the change 
in nominal GDP (∆GDPN) and the change is stock market returns (∆SM)24: 
€ 
Risk Measuret = C +α Risk Measuret−1 + β Δ3Mt− j
j=1
2
∑ + γ ΔTGAPt− j
j=1
2
∑ + λ ΔGDPNt− j
j=1
2
∑
+ϕ ΔSMt− j
j=1
2
∑ +ε
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of our dynamic panel model for seven risk measures. We 
first find that the LLP measure for credit portfolio quality does not fit in any model 
involving our variables. This can be related to the annual frequency of our data or to the 
fact that provision amounts are discretionary and are often used by banks as a mean to 
smooth income (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). 
The results from the remaining variables (columns II to VII) corroborate our previous 
finding on the risk-taking channel; we find a positive relation between low interest rates 
(the gap to the Taylor rule) and risk. In fact, we find a negative and significant coefficient 
for the TGAP coefficients in the LLR, STDROE and STDROA regressions, and a 
positive and significant coefficient of TGAP in the ZROE, ZROA and ZPSCR 
regressions25; a deeper gap between the three months interbank rate and the rate implied 
by the Taylor rule is associated with a higher risk after two years of time giving more 
evidence on the “too low for too long” theory on interest rates and bank risk. 
Also, results for the monetary policy stance seem to hold in four out of six models; the 
coefficients of ∆3M are positive and significant at 10% in models II and III, and positive 
                                                           
24 The variables ∆GDPN and ∆SM have been orthogonalized respectively with ∆3M and TGAP due to high 
correlation of 0.8 for ∆GDPN with ∆3M, and 0.59 for ∆SM with TGAP. The correlation with the modified 
variables dropped to zero. 
25 We remind that the latter three variables represent higher risk, the lower their values. 
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and significant at 1% in models VI and VII. On the short-term, the effect of a drop in 
interest rates reduces risk through interest burden cutback on outstanding loans, or 
through positive asset valuation. 
Models III, VI and VII (which show significant GDP effect) bring similar results as the 
EDF model showing a positive relation between GDP growth and bank risk. As we 
previously mentioned bank risk can take place in spite of good economic conditions 
(Delis and Kouretas, 2011) and the case of the French banking system seems to fall in 
that scheme. This result is atypical when compared to the literature where higher 
economic growth reduces bank risk. 
Last, the stock market returns have a significant effect on risk in models II, III, VI and 
VII; the change in stock market returns has a positive relation with the risk indicators. In 
periods of low interest rates, asset valuation is boosted which increases risk due to an 
illusion of higher collateral value and/or a balance sheet effect (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 
2003). Note in this section that results differ from the one obtained in the EDF regression 
as they follow the GDP growth pattern and back the idea that risk taking channel for 
French banks can occur despite economic and market growth. 
 
5. Risk-taking channel and bank characteristics 
In this section we estimate further regressions analyzing the effect of the TGAP variable 
with respect to individual characteristics, including bank size (SIZE), capitalization 
(CAP) and liquidity (LIQ)26. Whereas liquidity is addressed in the risk-taking literature 
(Jimenez et al. (2009), Altunbas et al. (2009), Ioannidou et al. (2009)) by the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets, we define liquidity as the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and 
short-term funding. Our definition can be interpreted as a pseudo-LCR27, which replicates 
better the regulator’s liquidity requirements. 
                                                           
26 SIZE = log of total assets; CAP = total equity / total assets; LIQ = liquid assets / deposits and short-term 
funding. 
27 Leverage Coverage Ratio= (High Quality Assets)/(30 Day Net cash Outflows) ≥ 100%, as by the Basel 
III committee definition. 
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We differentiate each of the above variables into three classes according to its percentile 
distribution; we label as “small” the variables below the 25% percentile region, as 
“average” the variables within the 25%-75% percentile, and as “large” the variables 
above the 75% percentile. We then add dummy variables “I” for each of the three classes, 
which we multiply with the significant TGAP in our regressions; the result is a dissecting 
of the TGAP effect within the three classes. The advantage with this approach is that it 
offers a dual filtering of the bank characteristic classes, first by level of significance and 
then by coefficient value. The model can be written as follows: 
€ 
Risk Measuret = C +α Risk Measuret−1 + β Δ3Mt− j
j=1
2
∑ + γ ΔTGAPt− j * Iclass i
j=1
2
∑ + λ ΔGDPNt− j
j=1
2
∑
+ϕ ΔSMt− j
j=1
2
∑ +ε
 
Results for size, capitalization and liquidity interaction with the Taylor rule gap variable 
are respectively reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10 for the six valid accounting based risk 
models (models II to VII). 
In Table 8, we conclude that the risk channel is more important for large French banks; 
notice a significance level of 1% for the “large SIZE” interaction with TGAP for all risk 
indicators except LLR (model II). Furthermore, for a same level of significance as is the 
case with the ZROA variable, “large SIZE” banks have a higher TGAP coefficient of 
20.9 versus 15.1 for “small SIZE” banks, thus delivering a stronger effect on bank risk 
level. Large bank can in fact engage in more risky activities because of higher 
competition or moral hazard. Similar results of “too big to fail” behavior where found in 
Altunbas et al (2009). 
Results for bank capitalization (Table 9) show that banks with lower equity to assets ratio 
have a higher risk-taking, backed by a significance level at 1% in regressions III, V, VI 
and VII. In regression VI, TGAP coefficient is 21.2 for small capitalization versus 18.7 
and 14.7 for average and large capitalizations respectively. We note that small 
capitalization level in our sample fall below 3.7% of equity to total assets, which is a 
relatively low level compared to sample mean of 6.11%. 
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After the recent crisis, regulators have noticed a pitfall in bank liquidity, in fact whereas 
banks where in line with capital requirements, their liquidity did not appear strong 
enough to withstand liquidity drought scenarios in interbank markets. In reaction to that, 
new liquidity ratios where defined by the Basel III committee (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010): the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio28 that are supposed to increase bank holding of “high quality assets” to avoid 
chocks or bank runs. Considering those recent developments on bank liquidity, we 
analyze the interest rate channel in respect to the liquidity ratio previously defined. 
We find in all six regressions (Table 10) that (more) liquid banks have a higher 
transmission mechanism (higher and more significant TGAP coefficient). This does not 
however mean that illiquid banks are less risky than liquid bank, but rather that a change 
in monetary policy in a too low for too long direction will have, all other things being 
equal and with the assumption of no change in bank behaviour, a higher effect on the 
level of risk of liquid banks. In the risk taking literature, the same effect for liquidity is 
found for the Spanish banking system (Jiménez et al, 2009) and for Bolivia (Ioannidou et 
al, 2009). When yields on “high quality assets” are low, liquid banks have a higher cost 
in carrying such assets, this can change their investment strategy towards more risky 
assets and/or their credit strategy towards riskier projects with longer maturity. Our 
findings raise a question on whether the new liquidity requirements will render banks 
more vulnerable to risk-taking, especially since maturity mismatch cannot be eliminated 
(without eliminating the transformation activity of banks). 
 
6. Risk-taking channel and income structure 
We now analyze risk-taking channel in relation with bank income structure. We try to 
explore if monetary policy, affects bank risk differently with respect to their product mix. 
 
 
                                                           
28 LCR= (High Quality Assets)/(30 Day Net cash Outflows) ≥ 100% 
NSFR= (Available Stable Funding)/(Required Stable Funding) ≥ 100% 
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- A brief literature on revenue diversification 
The literature on bank risk and revenue diversification is somewhat divided. 
Interestingly, results seem to differ according to their timing, mainly as a result of 
changes in the financial intermediation business model. Studies on the US banking 
industry in the seventies and the eighties give evidence on limited diversification benefits 
(Boyd et al, 1980) (Kwast, 1989). More recent studies show that that fee-based activities 
increased the volatility of bank revenue, as in DeYoung and Roland (2001) who analyze 
US commercial banks from 1988 to 1995. Stiroh (2004) analyses US commercial banks 
from 1988 to 1995 to find that net interest income and non-interest income are 
increasingly correlated leading to lower diversification benefits. Another study from 
Stiroh (2006) over the period 1997-2004 shows no significant link between non-interest 
income exposure and average returns. 
Turning to the European market and with more recent data on 734 banks from 1996 to 
2002, Lepetit et al (2007) study risk in relation to income structure. They find that higher 
reliance on non-interest activities is associated with more risk, but the relation is mainly 
associated with commission and fees generating activities rather than trading activities. 
More recently, De Jonghe (2010), studies the relation between income structure and 
systemic risk (measured by tail beta) on European banks during the 1992-2007 period, 
results show that a shift to non-interest generating activities increases bank systemic risk. 
The above results are in favor of basic banking, intuitively this can be explained 
(DeYoung and Roland, 2001) by factors such as the poor regulation on the non-interest 
activities, the important fixed costs associated with fee-based activities that are not yet 
amortized, or finally the high competition on fee and commission based markets. 
Our interest in income structure slightly differs from the above literature, as we seek to 
understand more on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. The question is whether 
the risk-taking mechanism is stronger in traditional banking and therefore could be linked 
to credit risk and loose screening standards, or if the transmission is rather related to fee-
based activities and is therefore subject to asset valuation and market risk. We have to 
acknowledge however that both activities are interdependent; in the case of a bubble 
 23 
burst, both trading portfolios and credit portfolios are affected, as price drop will hit both 
investment portfolios and credit collateral. 
 
- Indicators, methodology and results 
We account for income structure using two indicators used in the above mentioned 
literature to set the line between traditional banking versus market and consulting-based 
activities: The loans-to-assets ratio (LTA), and the net interest income (NII) defined as 
the ratio of net interest income to net operating income (Stiroh, 2004). We use the same 
strategy as in section III paragraph 5, by dividing each income structure indicator in three 
classes following the same percentile distribution we used previously. 
€ 
Risk Measuret = C +α Risk Measuret−1 + β Δ3Mt− j
j=1
2
∑ + γ ΔTGAPt− j * Iclass i
j=1
2
∑ + λ ΔGDPNt− j
j=1
2
∑
+ϕ ΔSMt− j
j=1
2
∑ +ε
 
We first analyze the loans to assets ratio and report results in Table 11. We find dual 
results; when risk is approximated by loan loss reserves (model II), the TGAP effect on 
risk level is higher for traditional banking (larger loans to assets ratios), which can mean 
that the transmission mechanism of low interest rates happens through credit risk-taking. 
We do not however jump to that conclusion since the effect itself is only significant at 
10%. Moreover, the results in models III to VII show an opposite and more significant 
relation with risk transmission being higher for banks with smaller LTA ratios. In fact, 
banks with LTA ratios larger than 75% (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics) do not 
show any risk-taking behavior following low interest rates. In contrast, banks with LTA 
ratios lower than 30% have the more significant TGAP effects in our regressions. 
Our second analysis on net interest income is reported in Table 12. We notice that the 
significance of the TGAP effect is well spread over the three defined NII classes, this 
means that the TGAP risk transmission reaches all banks disregarding their income 
structure. The magnitude of this effect however differs; it is stronger on banks with 
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medium and small NII ratios (ratios less than 77%). Commission and fee-based activities 
are more predisposed to risk-taking; reasons behind this are, as described by DeYoung 
and Roland (2001), the poor regulation of such activities and moral hazard, the important 
structures put in place for this relatively new business line and that are not yet amortized, 
and high competition in that segment (Rajan, 2005). 
The overall results from both income structure measures seem to advocate basic banking 
activities as a banking model whose risk is less affected by low interest rates. 
IV. Conclusion 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, researchers and policymakers assessment ended with 
a long list of economical explanations that included the poor regulatory framework, 
systemic institutions, complex financial instruments, rating agencies misleading opinions, 
blurry accounting measures, and bad corporate governance. Surprisingly, ultra 
expansionary monetary policy was found to be one possible cause to add in after recent 
empirical studies gave evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy: Bank risk-
appetite and risk-taking is higher after periods of very low interest rates. 
In fact, risk-taking can be explained by (a) a “search for high yield” in the presence of 
managerial compensation schemes linked to fixed objectives, (b) the procyclical 
valuation methods of assets, income and cash flows that change risk perception and credit 
decisions, (c) the abundant liquidity at a low cost available on demand for financial 
institutions, and (d) an insurance effect of central banks whose policies are perceived as 
guarantors of assets value. 
Moreover, we believe the topic of the paper is of current interest. The Federal Reserve 
expansionary monetary policy in response to the 2008 crisis is being accused of building-
up asset bubbles, in the same scheme that took place after the dotcom bubble. A situation 
better described in the saying “fool me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me”. 
Using a dynamic panel model, we have studied the risk of French banks from 1998 to 
2008, a period of very low interest rates. We concluded to the existence of a risk-taking 
channel; low interest rates (measured by the gap between the three months interbank rate 
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and the rate dictated by the Taylor rule) leads to a higher level of bank risk. We also find 
that liquid banks are more likely to amplify this channel, thus raising a question on 
whether the new Basel III liquidity requirements will render banks more prone to risk-
taking following low interest rates periods. 
Another interesting result is the positive relation found between GDP growth and bank 
risk, meaning that risk-taking can occur in good times. We finally capture the risk-taking 
channel with respect to bank income structure; results are in favor of universal banking 
models since the risk transmission is higher for commission and fee-based banks. In that, 
we hope to have added some insights that can be useful for supervisory and prudential 
authorities. 
This work is somewhat limited by the availability of the data as we would have preferred 
to work on quarterly data that convey more information, especially when using 
accounting based indicators. On the other hand, using in our case a higher frequency or 
even market data would have limited our sample to a handful of banks. Another 
limitation is the high correlation found between macroeconomic variables, that we 
managed to reduce with variables orthogonalization. 
Finally, the present topic can be subject to several enhancement and extensions for future 
research. It will be of interest to make similar studies on a larger multi-country scale 
using extreme risk indicators to see how the channel acts with respect to systemic risk. 
The channel can also be studied in relation with the credit contract structure in an attempt 
to differentiate the risk-taking effect on fixed interest rates regimes versus variable 
interest rates. The income structure approach we followed can be developed on a larger 
sample adding variables for commissions and trading activities. Accounting for 
securitization can also bring interesting results; the “originate and distribute” model 
might have an effect on risk-taking behavior, since banks anticipate bad assets transfer 
through a “true sale” mechanism. We also think of insurance companies as major actors 
on the financial intermediation scene; monetary policy effect should also be studied on 
“monolines” as their activity is closely linked to credit, and their risk is a potential threat 
to the banking system. 
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Tables and Charts 
 
 Table 2
Summary statistics of the variables (1998-2008)
Variables Number of observations Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max Q1 Q3
Variables accounting for Bank Risk
LLP 388 0.66 0.42 2.58 -2.53 47.03 0.15 0.67
LLR 363 4.44 3.71 3.10 0.00 14.36 2.17 6.10
STDROA 389 27.56 11.53 54.39 0.29 601.93 6.38 27.31
STDROE 389 4.45 2.19 9.76 0.01 111.87 1.08 4.90
ZROA 391 21.80 13.71 36.83 -0.69 446.75 5.80 25.17
ZROE 389 78.82 50.19 91.21 0.12 800.51 22.84 96.74
ZPSCR 391 8.57 4.96 17.31 -2.68 264.30 2.33 9.49
!EDF 128 0.00 -0.01 0.16 -0.53 0.60 -0.05 0.03
EDF 142 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.02 1.19 0.06 0.20
Variables accounting for Monetary Policy
TGAP1 11 -0.72 -0.98 1.18 -2.58 1.50 -1.81 0.47
TGAP 11 -0.29 -0.55 1.84 -2.63 3.79 -1.85 0.00
!3M 11 0.09 0.03 0.80 -1.03 1.55 -0.54 0.97
YSLOPE 11 1.02 0.93 0.70 -0.29 1.92 0.72 1.83
Variables accounting for Bank Caracteristics
LTA 388 52.87 53.27 26.66 1.46 98.08 30.22 75.03
NII 391 55.07 53.08 29.21 -64.36 152.38 37.56 77.14
SIZE 391 16.80 16.63 2.34 12.53 21.45 14.79 19.05
CAP 391 6.11 5.39 3.06 1.08 16.58 3.67 8.09
LIQ 391 41.43 33.47 34.39 0.23 177.43 13.98 59.59
Macroeconomic variables
!GDPN 11 3.98 3.93 0.73 2.77 5.23 3.37 4.55
!HP 11 8.51 7.90 9.48 -14.63 22.33 2.50 13.50
!SM 11 -5.68 -1.17 21.94 -52.59 33.64 -9.39 2.55
HHI 11 9.42 9.41 0.22 9.15 9.81 9.17 9.67
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total loans; LLR=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STDROA (ROE) = standard 
deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZROA (ROE) =(100+average ROA)/std dev ROA) is the Z-score of return on average 
assets (equity); ZPSCR = ZP score computed as: [(average ROA / STDOA)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STDROA)]; EDF = 
expected default frequency one year ahead; TGAP(1) = Taylor rule gap; !3M = change in the 3 months interbank rate; YSLOPE = 
slope of the yield curve (10Y-3M); LTA = total loans / total assets; NII = net interest income / total operating income; SIZE = log of 
total assets (th of Euros); CAP = total equity / total assets; LIQ = liquid assets / deposits and short-term funding; !GDPN = change in 
nominal GDP; !HP = change in the housing price index; !SM = changes in the stock market returns; HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index.
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Table 5
Levin, Lin, Chu stationnarity test
Variables coefficient      t-value        t-star          P > t
LLP  -1.40459      -15.429      -7.87087      0.0000
STDROA  -0.42146       -6.917      -1.89786       0.0289
STDROE  -0.55705       -8.189       3.39656        0.9997
ZROA  -1.03281      -14.676      -8.93678      0.0000
ZROE  -0.84100      -11.071      -4.58022      0.0000
ZPSCR  -0.97628      -14.491      -8.76697      0.0000
Lower p-values imply variable stationnarity
Table 4
Expected signs/effects of explanatory variables
Variables
Expected 
sign/relation
Dependent variables
Explanatory variables
Interpretation
EDF, LLP, LLR, STDROA, STDROE,  ZROA˚,  ZROE,˚  ZPSCR˚
TGAP -
!3M +
YSLOPE +/-
!GDPN +/-
!SM +/-
!HP -
HHI -
SIZE +/-
CAP - Well capitalized banks are less risky
- Better economic conditions increase projects' success and reduce bank risk
+ Favorable economic conditions induce higer risk-taking in search for high yield
Higher housing prices increase collateral value and reduce credit risk
+ large banks where mostly affected during the crisis / competition / moral hazard
- Small banks are more vulnerable and gamble for survival
+ In the case of a bubble burst risk should be higher (2008-2009 effect)
- otherwise, higher stock performance reduce credit risk and banks' risk
Higher competition increase bank risk
+ steep curves means higher missmatch opportunities, leading to higher risk-taking
- steeper curves could also increase profitability and hense reduce banks' risk
RTC, a lower gap scalar (higher gap) is associated with higher risk-taking
Lower interest rates derease bank risk on the short run (outstanding loans)
LIQ +
LTA -
NII -
Fee and commission based activities increase bank risk: poor regulation of non-
interest activities, important fixed costs not yet amortized, or high competition on 
fee and commission markets (DeYoung and Roland, 2001) 
More liquidity mean a higher cost when rates are low, wich enduces a more 
aggressive placements and hazardous long term financing
˚ for ZROA, ZROE, ZPSCR, expected signs and interpretation arr inverse as higher values mean lower risk
Variables definition: EDF = expected default frequency; LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR=loan loss 
reserves/total gross loans; STDROA (ROE) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZROA (ROE) = Z-
score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSCR = ZP score computed as: [(average ROA / STDOA)+(average(total 
equity/total asset) / STDROA)];  !3M = change in the 3 months interbank rate; TGAP = Taylor rule gap; YSLOPE = 
slope of the yield curve (10Y-3M); !GDPN = change in nominal GDP;  !SM = changes in the stock market return; !HP 
= change in the housing price index; HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index; SIZE = log of total assets (th of Euros); CAP = 
total equity / total assets; LIQ = liquid assets / deposits and short-term funding; LTA = total loans / total assets; NII = net 
interest income / total operating income.
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Table 6
R
egression results: Sam
ple 1
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
!ED
F (t-1)
0.316
***
0.103
0.214
***
0.096
0.228
***
0.096
0.225
***
0.096
0.325
***
0.099
!3M
  (t-1)
0.140
***
0.033
0.075
***
0.028
0.070
***
0.029
0.339
***
0.048
TG
A
P (t-1)
-0.184
***
0.050
-0.065
***
0.021
-0.062
***
0.021
-0.221
***
0.051
-0.125
***
0.055
!G
D
PN
*  (t-1)
3.740
***
0.783
1.525
***
0.296
1.537
***
0.295
0.869
***
0.181
!SM
  (t-1)
-0.014
***
0.003
-0.014
***
0.003
-0.008
***
0.002
!H
P  (t-1)
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.001
H
H
I
-0.042
***
0.009
!G
D
PN
  (t-1)
0.032
***
0.010
Y
SLO
PE  (t-1)
-0.359
***
0.069
Sam
ple period
N
. of banks, observations
14
113
14
113
14
113
14
113
14
113
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.302
0.361
0.162
0.115
0.256
A
R
1 (P-Value)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2 (P-Value)
0.539
0.508
0.534
0.646
0.557
(V
)
A
lternative m
odel 
w
ith yield curve slope
1998-2008
D
ependent Variable: 
A
nnual change in 
Expected D
efault 
Frequency
(I)
B
aseline m
odel
(II)
A
ccounting for stock 
m
arket effect
(III)
A
ccounting for 
housing price
(IV
)
A
ccounting for 
m
arket concentration
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is 
asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in 
residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: !ED
F = change in expected default frequency (1 year); !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith 
interest rate sm
oothing;  Y
SLO
PE = slope of the yield curve (10Y-3M
); !G
D
PN
 = change in nom
inal G
D
P; !G
D
PN
*=!G
D
PN
 orthogonalized w
ith 
respect to !3m
;  !SM
 = changes in the stock m
arket return; !H
P = change in the housing price index; H
H
I = H
erfindahl-H
irschm
an index.
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
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Table 7
R
egression results: A
ccounting based risk m
easures (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.749
***
0.127
0.695
***
0.068
0.734
***
0.057
0.667
***
0.019
0.324
***
0.056
0.274
***
0.054
0.324
***
0.053
!3M
 (t-1)
0.407
1.379
0.721
*
0.456
-1.082
2.232
-12.476
10.843
-0.167
19.669
26.784
***
11.227
5.966
*
4.005
!3M
 (t-2)
-1.776
2.282
-0.525
0.952
6.099
*
4.318
23.400
20.313
-4.076
36.197
-62.015
***
20.175
-16.820
***
7.476
TG
A
P (t-1)
-0.296
2.017
-0.746
*
0.478
1.133
2.373
7.837
8.775
-7.995
20.725
-11.000
11.837
-3.126
4.288
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.639
0.795
0.333
0.263
-2.621
***
1.313
-8.918
***
4.230
17.405
*
10.389
18.650
***
5.753
4.097
**
2.221
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
3.180
3.816
1.556
1.298
-6.673
6.092
-36.142
28.416
28.235
56.571
34.077
32.769
19.359
*
11.766
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
-6.410
4.696
0.849
1.796
13.519
*
8.786
37.120
27.862
-29.244
70.586
-87.907
***
38.695
-25.243
*
15.061
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.063
0.097
-0.055
0.039
0.249
0.177
1.140
0.979
0.221
1.526
-2.444
***
0.860
-0.646
***
0.312
!SM
* (t-2)
0.006
0.033
-0.020
**
0.011
-0.065
0.055
0.016
0.145
-0.242
0.445
0.225
0.229
0.073
0.092
C
onstant
0.687
2.747
0.142
0.781
0.540
3.431
12.926
11.517
59.245
**
29.919
16.990
16.973
5.173
6.346
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
321
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.100
0.125
0.338
0.370
0.487
0.711
0.203
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.096
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.392
0.730
0.597
0.577
0.737
0.449
0.051
1998-2008
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
1998-2008
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a H
ansen test of 
0.490.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) 
=(100+average R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = 
change in the 3 m
onths interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns 
orthogonalized w
ith respect to TG
A
P. ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
D
ependent Variables: 
R
isk m
easure
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(I)
LLP
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
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Table 8
R
egression results: Individual effect linked to bank size (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.688
***
0.034
0.725
***
0.056
0.656
***
0.025
0.318
***
0.056
0.273
***
0.053
0.315
***
0.054
!3M
 (t-1)
0.727
*
0.448
-1.713
2.185
-10.521
9.882
-0.843
19.687
26.065
***
11.189
6.037
4.094
!3M
 (t-2)
-0.482
0.874
5.944
4.270
21.526
24.459
-1.294
36.047
-60.563
***
20.049
-16.817
***
7.612
TG
A
P (t-1)
0.824
2.273
5.611
8.455
-8.184
20.640
-10.153
11.777
-3.166
4.374
TG
A
P (t-1)*SIZE (sm
all)
-0.96
**
0.495
TG
A
P (t-1)*SIZE (average)
-0.75
*
0.484
TG
A
P (t-1)*SIZE (large)
-0.64
0.491
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.327
0.259
TG
A
P (t-2)*SIZE (sm
all)
-2.035
*
1.267
-7.963
*
4.949
11.178
11.595
15.137
***
6.074
2.499
2.502
TG
A
P (t-2)*SIZE (average)
-2.103
*
1.267
-6.075
4.428
14.898
10.928
18.612
***
5.939
4.232
**
2.353
TG
A
P (t-2)*SIZE (large)
-3.548
***
1.270
-8.607
***
4.078
23.378
***
11.101
20.987
***
6.106
5.344
***
2.506
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
1.631
1.260
-6.833
5.969
-36.694
*
24.597
28.965
56.290
29.644
32.459
19.366
*
11.990
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
0.890
1.765
13.809
*
8.691
32.355
32.574
-21.712
70.048
-85.800
***
38.439
-25.001
*
15.314
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.054
*
0.036
0.240
0.176
1.043
0.313
0.301
1.526
-2.363
***
0.855
-0.650
***
0.319
!SM
* (t-2)
-0.020
**
0.011
-0.062
0.055
0.035
0.125
-0.256
0.444
0.245
0.228
0.069
0.094
C
onstant
0.132
0.724
0.292
3.408
12.308
10.498
57.883
**
29.734
17.840
16.902
5.087
6.481
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.108
0.300
0.280
0.576
0.641
0.128
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.096
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.756
0.371
0.598
0.702
0.433
0.052
D
ependent Variables: R
isk 
m
easure
(I)
LLP (not applicable)
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a H
ansen test of 
0.491.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) =(100+average 
R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths 
interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns orthogonalized w
ith respect 
to TG
A
P; SIZE = log of total assets (th of euros). ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
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Table 9
R
egression results: Individual effect linked to bank capitalization (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.701
***
0.034
0.748
***
0.056
0.659
***
0.022
0.330
***
0.056
0.279
***
0.053
0.312
***
0.054
!3M
 (t-1)
0.687
*
0.445
-2.188
2.171
-9.815
10.426
-0.100
19.687
25.812
***
11.129
6.681
*
4.077
!3M
 (t-2)
-0.333
0.872
6.182
4.257
19.619
23.706
-2.659
35.884
-60.521
***
20.004
-18.070
***
7.608
TG
A
P (t-1)
1.186
2.246
5.562
9.165
-7.575
20.514
-9.733
11.735
-3.290
4.352
TG
A
P (t-1)*C
A
P (sm
all)
-0.51
0.488
TG
A
P (t-1)*C
A
P (average)
-0.91
**
0.481
TG
A
P (t-1)*C
A
P (large)
-0.73
*
0.491
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.292
0.258
TG
A
P (t-2)*C
A
P (sm
all)
-4.038
***
1.303
-6.910
4.725
28.415
***
11.531
21.176
***
5.865
5.296
***
2.562
TG
A
P (t-2)*C
A
P (average)
-2.157
*
1.229
-5.993
5.067
12.539
10.792
18.680
***
5.865
4.750
***
2.336
TG
A
P (t-2)*C
A
P (large)
-2.114
*
1.236
-8.028
*
4.521
12.699
11.364
14.697
***
5.954
2.109
2.479
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
1.584
1.247
-7.095
5.926
-35.332
24.511
24.101
56.086
28.169
32.546
19.995
*
11.958
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
1.097
1.761
14.085
*
8.645
29.355
33.014
-21.730
69.858
-85.029
***
38.338
-26.324
*
15.282
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.048
0.036
0.266
*
0.176
0.974
1.026
0.238
1.515
-2.357
***
0.852
-0.712
***
0.318
!SM
* (t-2)
-0.020
**
0.011
-0.049
0.054
0.035
0.129
-0.279
0.441
0.237
0.852
0.061
0.094
C
onstant
0.049
0.072
0.696
3.368
12.742
11.222
56.975
**
29.597
17.829
16.837
4.769
6.441
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.132
0.424
0.264
0.513
0.433
0.154
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.095
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.709
0.977
0.565
0.777
0.412
0.050
D
ependent Variables: R
isk 
m
easure
(I)
LLP (not applicable)
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a H
ansen test of 
0.412.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) =(100+average 
R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths 
interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns orthogonalized w
ith respect 
to TG
A
P; C
A
P = total equity / total assets. ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
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Table 10
R
egression results: Individual effect linked to bank liquidity (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.070
***
0.033
0.730
***
0.056
0.658
***
0.019
0.316
***
0.056
0.267
***
0.053
0.306
***
0.055
!3M
 (t-1)
0.757
*
0.447
-1.867
2.184
-8.084
13.474
-0.494
19.668
26.447
***
11.159
5.584
4.079
!3M
 (t-2)
-0.629
0.875
5.891
4.285
20.177
26.199
-2.998
36.125
-60.994
***
20.023
-16.277
***
7.601
TG
A
P (t-1)
1.093
2.269
2.454
10.347
-7.968
20.746
-10.926
11.781
-2.818
4.365
TG
A
P (t-1)*LIQ
 (sm
all)
-0.79
*
0.493
TG
A
P (t-1)*LIQ
 (average)
-0.66
0.479
TG
A
P (t-1)*LIQ
 (large)
-0.96
**
0.49
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.367
0.260
TG
A
P (t-2)*LIQ
 (sm
all)
-1.689
1.294
-3.032
5.927
12.088
11.755
14.519
***
6.195
1.767
2.541
TG
A
P (t-2)*LIQ
 (average)
-2.715
***
1.233
-7.531
5.768
18.073
*
10.710
19.027
***
5.847
4.363
**
2.329
TG
A
P (t-2)*LIQ
 (large)
-2.361
**
1.269
-7.485
*
4.518
18.820
*
11.621
20.545
***
6.102
5.132
***
2.506
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
1.641
1.251
-7.490
5.994
-29.706
33.034
28.578
56.718
34.326
32.715
18.582
*
12.002
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
0.688
1.764
12.998
*
8.723
36.079
31.885
-25.407
70.418
-85.549
***
38.386
-24.123
*
15.296
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.059
*
0.036
0.246
0.177
0.910
1.225
0.255
1.526
-2.410
***
0.855
-0.618
**
0.318
!SM
* (t-2)
-0.020
**
0.011
-0.057
0.055
-0.011
0.156
-0.247
1.525
0.240
0.227
0.074
0.094
C
onstant
0.142
0.719
0.801
3.402
8.307
12.057
59.010
**
29.959
16.764
16.891
5.542
6.461
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.096
0.411
0.343
0.507
0.580
0.203
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.090
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.767
0.699
0.620
0.767
0.431
0.051
D
ependent Variables: R
isk 
m
easure
(I)
LLP (not applicable)
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a hansen test of 0.418.  
Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) =(100+average 
R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths 
interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns orthogonalized w
ith respect 
to TG
A
; LIQ
 = liquid assets / deposits and short-term
 funding. ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
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Table 11
R
egression results: Individual effect linked to incom
e structure, L
oans to assets (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.698
***
0.033
0.727
***
0.056
0.666
***
0.021
0.317
***
0.056
0.263
***
0.053
0.293
***
0.055
!3M
 (t-1)
0.701
*
0.448
-1.823
2.185
-5.924
11.281
-0.785
19.622
25.413
***
11.105
6.138
*
4.048
!3M
 (t-2)
-0.465
0.874
6.005
4.288
17.235
23.816
-2.678
36.058
-59.960
***
19.915
-17.106
***
7.546
TG
A
P (t-1)
1.006
2.268
1.210
7.966
-8.057
20.661
-10.278
11.708
-3.304
4.329
TG
A
P (t-1)*LTA
 (sm
all)
-0.71
0.491
TG
A
P (t-1)*LTA
 (average)
-0.76
*
0.484
TG
A
P (t-1)*LTA
 (large)
-0.770
*
0.493
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.314
0.259
TG
A
P (t-2)*LTA
 (sm
all)
-2.630
***
1.263
-9.646
***
4.453
19.704
*
11.426
18.337
***
5.964
4.731
**
2.439
TG
A
P (t-2)*LTA
 (average)
-2.660
***
1.241
-5.770
4.879
18.764
*
10.755
19.807
***
5.868
4.984
***
2.329
TG
A
P (t-2)*LTA
 (large)
-1.608
1.284
-3.526
5.162
8.841
11.749
12.781
**
6.188
0.788
2.551
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
1.532
1.257
-7.384
5.978
-24.335
26.602
30.071
56.403
34.704
32.430
20.669
*
11.885
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
0.950
1.762
13.363
*
8.717
35.184
29.685
-25.759
70.258
-84.551
***
38.172
-25.247
*
15.184
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.053
0.036
0.247
0.177
0.739
1.071
0.275
1.522
-2.344
***
0.850
-0.666
**
0.315
!SM
* (t-2)
-0.020
**
0.011
-0.060
0.055
-0.051
0.121
-0.239
1.522
0.244
0.226
0.067
0.093
C
onstant
0.114
0.723
0.636
3.398
6.096
9.528
58.908
**
29.840
17.292
16.795
4.945
6.408
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.130
0.397
0.343
0.478
0.466
0.186
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.092
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.720
0.626
0.618
0.757
0.430
0.048
D
ependent Variables: R
isk 
m
easure
(I)
LLP (not applicable)
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a H
ansen test of 
0.554.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) =(100+average 
R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths 
interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns orthogonalized w
ith respect 
to TG
A
; LTA
 = total loans / total assets. ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
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Table 12
R
egression results: Individual effect linked to incom
e structure, N
et interest revenues (Sam
ple 2)
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
C
oef.
S. Error
R
isk M
easure (t-1)
0.708
***
0.031
0.733
***
0.056
0.666
***
0.016
0.324
***
0.056
0.272
***
0.054
0.322
***
0.054
!3M
 (t-1)
0.833
**
0.422
-1.721
2.178
-9.576
9.886
0.284
19.599
26.910
***
11.219
5.996
4.092
!3M
 (t-2)
-0.599
0.821
6.016
4.306
24.971
21.592
0.628
36.133
-62.556
***
20.176
-16.955
***
7.643
TG
A
P (t-1)
0.839
2.270
2.905
9.491
-10.614
20.704
-10.870
11.837
-3.095
4.383
TG
A
P (t-1)*N
II (sm
all)
-0.51
0.508
TG
A
P (t-1)*N
II (average)
-3.32
***
0.644
TG
A
P (t-1)*N
II (large)
-0.81
**
0.451
TG
A
P (t-2)
0.370
*
0.243
TG
A
P (t-2)*N
II (sm
all)
-3.054
**
1.588
-12.594
***
5.116
16.088
16.167
21.428
***
7.852
5.259
*
3.397
TG
A
P (t-2)*N
II (average)
-1.548
2.412
-12.193
***
4.431
-18.809
26.136
24.809
**
12.315
6.710
5.642
TG
A
P (t-2)*N
II (large)
-2.360
**
1.215
-6.644
*
4.284
16.397
*
10.377
18.608
***
5.760
4.055
*
2.275
!G
D
PN
* (t-1)
2.022
*
1.185
-6.826
5.969
-34.431
*
22.949
32.925
56.415
34.193
32.730
19.424
*
12.023
!G
D
PN
* (t-2)
0.529
1.658
13.401
*
8.809
39.362
28.520
-16.771
70.759
-89.531
***
38.755
-25.743
*
15.420
!SM
* (t-1)
-0.060
*
0.033
0.243
0.177
1.114
0.935
0.257
1.521
-2.459
***
0.860
-0.649
**
0.319
!SM
* (t-2)
-0.020
**
0.010
-0.064
0.177
-0.026
0.136
-0.298
0.445
0.253
0.229
0.075
0.094
C
onstant
-0.005
0.680
0.400
3.415
8.771
11.070
53.138
*
30.043
17.528
16.994
5.344
6.496
Sam
ple period
N
o of banks, N
o of obs
37
297
37
321
37
321
37
321
37
324
37
317
Sargan Test (P-Value)
0.117
0.406
0.280
0.521
0.706
0.196
A
R
1
0.000
0.000
0.096
0.000
0.000
0.000
A
R
2
0.316
0.532
0.623
0.743
0.441
0.055
D
ependent Variables: R
isk 
m
easure
(I)
LLP (not applicable)
(II)
LLR
(III)
STD
R
O
E
(IV
)
STD
R
O
A
(V
I)
ZR
O
A
˚
(V
II)
ZPSC
R
˚
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
1998-2008
(V
)
ZR
O
E˚
N
otes: W
e use A
rellano-B
over (1995) system
 panel-data estim
ator. "Sargan Test": p- value of the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, w
hich is asym
ptotically distributed as "2 under the null of instrum
ent 
validity. "A
R
1 (A
R
2)": p-value of the A
rellano-B
ond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (order 2) is 0. In m
odel IV
 w
e used the tw
o step, robust option that w
e validate w
ith a H
ansen test of 
0.589.  Significance levels at 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Variables definition: LLP = loan loss provision/total gross loans; LLR
=loan loss reserves/total gross loans; STD
R
O
A
 (R
O
E) = standard deviation of return on average assets (equity); ZR
O
A
 (R
O
E) =(100+average 
R
O
A
)/std dev R
O
A
) is the Z-score of return on average assets (equity); ZPSC
R
 = ZP score com
puted as: [(average R
O
A
 / STD
R
O
A
)+(average(total equity/total asset) / STD
R
O
A
)]; !3M
 = change in the 3 m
onths 
interbank rate; TG
A
P = Taylor rule gap w
ith interest rate sm
oothing; !G
D
PN
* = change in nom
inal G
D
P orthogonalized w
ith respect to !3m
; !SM
* = changes in the stock m
arket returns orthogonalized w
ith respect 
to TG
A
; N
II = net interest incom
e / total operating incom
e ˚ for ZR
O
A
, ZR
O
E, ZPSC
R
, signs  interpretation is inverted as higher values m
ean low
er bank risk.
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